Is Meaningful Agreement Possible in a Group of 20?
In recent G8 meetings, commitments have been made on issues such as the economic crisis, poverty, climate change, development, Africa, global growth and stability, financial markets, investment, innovation, energy efficiency, energy security, clean energy, corruption, modern education systems, infectious diseases, globalization, and international trade. For a variety of reasons, many of the commitments have not been fulfilled, 4 but it is anticipated that a Leadership of Twenty (L-20) council will be able to break deadlocks on several of these important issues. 5 However, because the challenges of reaching a consensus coalition of agreement will be greater with twenty leaders than with eight, we will consider whether or not a meaningful coalition is possible for the former number.
Theories relating coalition size to effectiveness include those of William Riker and Robert Axelrod. 6 Riker reasoned that there is a tradeoff between large and small coalitions because, in the context of global agreements, the side payments required to sustain the agreement might outweigh the benefits. Axelrod pointed out that the less conflict of interest there is in a coalition, the more likely the coalition will form and the longer its duration. The implication for L-20 membership is that we need a group that is just large enough for effectiveness and no larger.
Barrett, Carraro, Finus, and other researchers have considerably extended the theory of coalitions in international agreements. Early results showed that a coalition size of three was the most that we could expect for a nontrivial agreement, and that more countries would reach agreement only if they did not stretch beyond what they would do bilaterally without the agreement. 7 These discouraging results were subsequently improved by introducing into the analysis transfer schemes ("side payments"), farsighted negotiators, and issue linkage.
Transfer Schemes
Although side payments or transfers may increase the number of signatories, 8 they are uncommon in practice because they are politically unpopular and may provide little incentive for change. Transfer schemes for climate change, such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), have generally not been effective. 9 
Farsighted Thinking
Negotiators are farsighted when they anticipate the ultimate impact of their decisions on the coalition. 10 For example, a country may consider opting out of the coalition because it can free-ride on the benefits but can foresee that other countries will also opt out, thereby reducing its free-riding benefits to less than they would be within the coalition. Farsightedness in this sense is likely to be characteristic of most L-20 leaders and can be facilitated by pre-meeting analysis of possible outcomes.
Of course, there is another sense in which the leaders will need to be farsighted. The nature of their political situations encourages them to have shortterm sight that extends only to the next election, but dealing with the climate change issue requires farsighted consideration of future generations. This is an interesting challenge for the L-20, and farsightedness in both senses will be required for meaningful agreement to take place.
Issue Linkage
Issue linkage is a well-known approach for theoretically improving the possibilities for agreement in international negotiations, 11 but it is not easy to achieve or common in practice. Even the theoretical results place limitations on the potential of issue linkage. Although it is generally accepted that issue linkage expands the opportunity for tradeoffs and fosters agreements that are acceptable to asymmetric countries (such as developed and developing countries), there are limitations.
One issue-linkage strategy links a public good (such as climate policy) with a club good (such as collaborative R&D). For issue linkage to be successful, the net benefit from the public good must be sufficiently large so that payoff is higher with linkage than without. However, while issue linkage may increase the size of the environmental coalition, it will likely decrease the number of participants in the R&D agreement, offsetting environmental benefits with technology losses. 12 In fact, simulations have demonstrated that linking R&D and climate change may not enhance agreement. 13 Now consider the environment issue with trade by making trade cooperation conditional on environmental cooperation. This type of linkage can play a facilitating role in an agreement, but only in the case in which costs and benefits of the environmental issue are small in comparison with the costs and benefits of the trade policies, which is not the case for the climate change issue. 14 Linking trade to the climate change issues that have huge costs and benefits is not likely to facilitate agreement.
Generally, issue linkage is more likely to foster agreement on two issues if countries value the payoffs of each issue independently. 15 For example, consider again a linkage of trade and environmental issues. Because emissions abatement may reduce exports, values of an emission tax policy are interdependent with values of an export tax or import tariff policy. The fact that the trade policy and environmental policy incentives cannot be separated in a clear-cut manner diminishes the effectiveness of linking the policies.
Because of theoretical limitations to the effectiveness of issue linkage, and the analysis and time required to determine linkages, it is not surprising that actual examples of issue linkage are few. In the G7/G8 setting, issue linkage has been used only twice. The 1978 G7 meeting in Bonn produced a deal that linked macroeconomic stimulus, energy policy, and trade liberalization. The 2002 G8 meeting in Kananaskis resulted in a deal that linked nuclear and chemical weapons cleanup with funding for the HIPC (heavily indebted poor countries) initiative. In the environmental regime, increased effectiveness of three separate regimes in the UN Environment Programme, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Trade Organization was achieved with linkages among biological diversity, plant genetic resources, and trade-related intellectual property rights. 16 In the refugee regime, the success of the International Conference on Central American Refugees was enhanced by linkages among development aid, trade links, and human rights, while the Indo-Chinese Comprehensive Plan of Action was similarly enhanced by linkages among issues of development assistance, peace, and security. 17 A preliminary proposal for the initial L-20 meeting on climate change recommends commitments on issues related to emission targets and fiscal measures, markets and institutions, energy policy, research, technology transfer, adaptation, and monitoring and evaluation. 18 These issues can be considered separately, but it may be possible to foster agreement among the twenty lead-ers by developing strategies for issue linkage. 19 It may be beneficial to consider in advance the types, magnitudes, and dependencies among the costs and benefits of the countries so that opportunities for linkage can be anticipated. 20 However, while these possibilities might be prepared for the leaders in advance, the meeting's informality may bring linkages to light as they become evident and necessary for consensus.
Meaningful Consensus
Can meaningful consensus be achieved? The L-20 participants have considerable expertise building coalitions within their political parties and national assemblies that are large enough to win. This experience should facilitate their joint efforts in achieving full consensus coalitions in the L-20. Although the most critical factor for consensus is that each leader has a strong desire to reach agreement and a willingness to look for solutions that resolve differences, 21 the L-20 format itself will foster consensus by facilitating relationships among the leaders. We know that repeated interactions foster trust and cooperation, and Paul Martin has emphasized that the regularity of the meetings among the same leaders (i.e., without variable geometry) has fostered agreement in the G8 and the G-20 and thus should also foster consensus in the L-20 forum. 22 Leaders represent countries that have differences in resources, relative valuations, forecasts, risk preferences, and time preferences, and these differences provide opportunities to compromise by trading on differences across the issues being considered. However, in order to avoid deadlocks, all leaders must be willing to provide full information on these differences. 23 International agreements have sometimes used a prearranged sufficient consensus rule 24 if full consensus cannot be reached. However, the challenges of implementing agreements are made worse by this rule, and sufficient consensus would be a disappointing outcome. For climate change and energy security, there are many possible strategies, 25 and the leaders must strive to reach consensus that breaks the climate and energy deadlocks. Now that we have established that it is theoretically possible for a group of twenty world leaders to achieve meaningful consensus by the diligent application of farsightedness and issue linkage, we determine who should be at the table by considering who caused the problem, who is most affected, and who can do something about it.
Who Caused the Problem?
The measure of cumulative historical emissions is the best proxy measure for responsibility for the current atmospheric concentration ( Table 2 ). The amount of cumulative emissions is a relatively uncontroversial criterion in that it fairly reflects the degree to which different countries contributed to the current problem. If there are to be decisions on burden sharing, those who created the bur- 
Who Is Most Affected?
It is generally agreed that climate change will impact most those who had no part in creating the problem. Their voices should be included. Several rationales have been considered, each with a different proxy variable. Possible criteria are total population, countries most affected by extreme weather events, countries with the largest land mass, or countries with the largest population in low-elevation coastal zones. What about overall vulnerability? Because every person is affected, one could argue that total population is the appropriate criterion (Table 3) . Eleven of the countries in this list are also on the list of top cumulative emitters in Table 2 . But everybody is not impacted in the same way. Should we include countries most exposed to the increasing frequency of extreme weather events? Countries most vulnerable to sea-level rise would want to be at the decisionmaking table, and a similar claim could be made by countries whose coastal regions are most at risk from climate change (Table 4) .
One serious attempt to compute an overall index of vulnerability was led by UNEP with various partners (Table 5 ). This index is a combination of fifty indicators related to climate change, biodiversity, water, agriculture and fisheries, human health, desertification, and exposure to natural disasters. 
Who Can Do Something About It?
Here, too, there are several rationales-each with a different proxy variable. Criteria include forecasted emissions, financial resources to fund mitigation and adaptation, control over the rate of extraction of hydrocarbon resources, possession of large carbon sinks, intellectual resources or venture capital to pursue innovation, trade flows to potentially impose border tax adjustments, national ability to implement decisions, military power to force compliance, or willingness to pay for global public goods. Following is an explanation of each of these rationales:
1. To be held accountable, the countries that will be responsible for future increases in concentration in a business-as-usual world should be at the table (Table 6) .
2. The countries with the financial resources to invest in mitigation and adaptation should be at the table. The measures could be GDP (measured as purchasing power parity) today, or estimated future GDP in say, 2020. Alternatively, it could be current foreign exchange reserves (Table 7) .
3. Countries with control of energy resources have the ability to limit emissions by reducing production, or requiring scrubbing or carbon capture and sequestration as a condition of sale (Table 8) .
4. Countries with the largest forests and the ability to act as carbon sinks should be in the room. Alternatively, given that sovereign countries are responsible for stewardship of the land within their borders, land mass 
Constituting Global Leadership
(square miles of territory) should be the proxy measure for accountability (Table 9) . 5. Which countries have the intellectual resources to find solutions, or the venture capital system to promote innovation (Table 10)? 6. Which countries can influence carbon content by trade (border tax adjustments) or investment policy (Table 11)? 7. From the perspective of ability to arrange compliance, countries can be ranked by the quality of their government structure, increasing the likelihood that internal policy will be implemented or by military expenditure, which will support foreign policy (Table 12 ).
8. What about the intangibles of prosperity and economic freedom? Some argue that innovative solutions will be found only in an environment of prosperity or a country unfettered by excessive government control (Table  13) .
9. Which countries have been willing to pay for global public goods? The top contributors have not only indicated a willingness to pay for public goods; their contributions can lend weight to their efforts to influence implementation of policies adopted by the G-20 leaders (Table 14 ).
An Index Approach
The Chinese have a concept of "comprehensive national power" that attempts to account for eight factors: natural resources, economic activities capability, foreign economic activities capability, scientific and technological capability, social development level, military capability, government regulation and control capability, and foreign affairs capability. Each factor is itself an index of many component measures. Each is given a weight, and a final numerical index is computed (Table 15 ). The complete congruence of this list with the seventeen countries of the Major Economies Forum, first convened by the United States in 2007, is remarkable. Adding Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Argentina would mirror the composition of the G-20.
Conclusion
What does this all mean? We have established that it is theoretically possible for a group of twenty leaders to reach a consensus agreement, provided that they are farsighted about the effects of their decisions, seek opportunities for issue linkage, and provide full disclosure about their values and interests. For membership, the Finance Ministers' G-20 is, on balance, a pretty fair grouping, although any nation not included may be unhappy and challenge the criteria that excludes it.
The anomalies are the exclusion of Nigeria, Pakistan, and Spain if population or GDP are the appropriate criteria. Similarly, Ukraine, Iran, Poland, and Spain would not be excluded if cumulative emissions were the key variable. However, Spain and Poland are represented in the G-20 by the president of the European Commission, and Pakistan, Nigeria, and Iran are not appropriate members because they rank tenth, fifteenth, and thirty-eighth (we disagree and prefer rankings remain in numerical form) in the 2009 Failed States Index. 26 The highest failed state ranking of the G-20 countries is Indonesia, at position sixty-two, followed by Turkey at eighty-five and Saudi Arabia at eighty-nine. The Finance Ministers' G-20 is weakest in terms of indicators of those most affected by climate change, but fourteen of the countries do appear in Tables 3 to 5 . The G-20 is relatively strong in terms of indicators of which countries have caused climate change (with sixteen of the countries included in Table 2 ) and most strong in terms of being Tables  6 to 14) . Constructing indices is a perilous process-to a large extent the rule of "garbage in, garbage out" applies. Adjusting the weights of the various components can skew the outcomes. But it is interesting that the "comprehensive national power" rankings of seventeen countries in Table 15 , computed in 1996 before the formation of the G-20, included sixteen of the G-20. Moreover, in a consolidation of the rankings in our Tables 2 to 14, the same G-20 countries fill the top sixteen positions.
To provide legitimacy, an approach must be developed to deal with the underrepresentation of African countries. These and the other excluded countries will require intensive consultation and substantive outreach efforts. The structure of the L-20 implicitly assumes that a sufficient consensus rule 27 will be accepted by all countries. In any case, binding decisions will be taken in the United Nations, where countries not in the L-20 will have a voice.
The conclusion is that the G-20 is as good as it gets-accepting the proposition that if the group is to have no second-class members, it can be no larger. Note: CAPPED country names represent countries in the Group of 20 industrialized countries.
